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OF TIME, PLACE, AND THE ALASKA
CONSTITUTION
G. ALAN TARR*
ABSTRACT
This Article places the Alaska Constitution in historical perspective by
comparing it with other state constitutions. It first considers how the
convention delegates’ need to satisfy four audiences—Congress, Alaska
residents who would ratify the constitution, those who would live under the
constitution, and posterity—affected the constitution’s design. It next shows
how the Alaska Constitution reflects the fact that it is the state’s first
constitution, that it is a western constitution, and that it is a mid-twentiethcentury constitution. Finally, it compares the Alaska Constitution with the
Hawaii Constitution, which was drafted at the same time.

I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutions inevitably reflect the time and place of their creation.
This is especially true of state constitutions: knowing when and where a
state constitution originated is crucial for understanding it. The Alaska
Constitution, which was completed and ratified in 1956 and took effect
with statehood in 1959,1 is a case in point. It is a western constitution, and
Copyright  2018 G. Alan Tarr.
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1. The Constitution of the State of Alaska, THE GREAT STATE OF ALASKA,
https://ltgov.alaska.gov/services/alaskas-constitution/ (last visited Sept. 21,
2018). In 1949, Alaska’s territorial legislature formed the Alaska Statehood
Committee, which helped prepare for a constitutional convention. Who’s Who:
Alaskans: Statehood Committee, UNIV. OF ALASKA (June 17, 2009),
https://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/whos-who/alaskans/statehoodcommittee/. In September 1955, Alaskans in a nonpartisan election chose the
delegates to the convention. Hearing on SB 29 and SB 49, S. STATE AFFAIRS STANDING
COMM., 26th Leg. (2009) (statement of Mayor Botelho at 9:18:00 AM). The
convention convened on November 8, 1955, and adjourned on February 5, 1956,
submitting its work to the voters for ratification. June Allen, Alaska’s Constitutional
Convention: 1955 Honoring its 50th Anniversary, STORIES IN THE NEWS (Sept. 15,
2005), http://www.sitnews.us/JuneAllen/ConstitutionalConvention/091605
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western constitutions differ in both style and substance from their eastern,
southern, and midwestern counterparts.2 In part, these differences are a
matter of timing—states admitted to the Union later have confronted
some problems not present for earlier generations.3 In part too, the
differences are a matter of population—the initial western constitutions
were designed for states that were thinly settled but with an expectation
of growth and development.4 And in part, western constitutions reflect
the geography and economy of the region—for example, several deal with
water resources and mining, whereas the constitutions of other regions
deal with these differently or not at all.5 The Alaska Constitution is also a
mid-twentieth-century constitution, and as this Article shows, the
constitutions drafted in the years following World War II are themselves
distinctive, reflecting a particular reform perspective.6
Finally, the Alaska Constitution is the state’s first—and thus far
only—constitution. This is important because subsequent constitutions in
a state (and most states have had multiple constitutions) typically
resemble the state’s earlier constitutions, introducing changes to the
earlier template rather than altogether abandoning it.7 As this Article
reveals, the most fruitful comparison here is with the Hawaii

_50th _anniversary.html. Alaskans ratified the constitution by a vote of 17,477 to
8180 on April 24, 1956. Statehood Files: Voting Certificate 1956, University of
Alaska (June 17, 2009), https://www.alaska.edu/creating alaska/statehoodfiles/voting-certificate-1956/. President Dwight Eisenhower signed the Alaska
statehood bill in 1958, and Alaska officially became a state on January 3, 1959.
Alaska Statehood, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER: PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY, MUSEUM, AND
BOYHOOD
HOME,
https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online
_documents/alaska_statehood.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
2. See, e.g., AMY BRIDGES, DEMOCRATIC BEGINNINGS: FOUNDING THE WESTERN
STATES (2015); DAVID ALAN JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE FAR WEST: CALIFORNIA,
OREGON, AND NEVADA, 1840–1890 (1992); John D. Hicks, The Constitutions of the
Northwest States, 23 U. STUD. U. NEB. 1 (1923). For a treatment of constitutional
development in another region that underscores the distinctiveness of western
constitutionalism, see PAUL E. HERRON, FRAMING THE SOLID SOUTH: THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF SECESSION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND REDEMPTION,
1860–1902 (2017).
3. See, e.g., Fred A. Seaton, Alaska’s Struggle for Statehood, 39 NEB. L. REV. 253
(1960); Alaska’s Long Struggle for Statehood, P.R. REPORT (Oct. 1, 2012),
https://www.puertoricoreport.com/alaskas-long-struggle-forstatehood/#.
W6rwNpNKifU.
4. See BRIDGES, supra note 2, at 31–41 (discussing the initial settlement of the
first western territories to become states and its impact on state constitutional
conventions).
5. Id. at 4–5; G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 197–98
(Princeton Univ. Press ed. 1998).
6. See TARR, supra note 5, at 153–61.
7. See id. at 144−72 (discussing how state constitutions have evolved in the
twentieth century).
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Constitution, as both Alaska and Hawaii were admitted as states in 1959,
and their fates pre-admission were closely connected.
This Article clarifies what is distinctive about the Alaska
Constitution and about Alaska’s constitutional experience by placing it in
a national context. First, it describes the political circumstances in which
the Alaska Constitution was framed. Next, it examines how time and
place influenced the substance and development of the Alaska
Constitution, focusing on its character as a first constitution, a western
constitution, and a mid-twentieth century constitution. It then considers
Alaska’s constitutional experience in comparison with Hawaii’s. Finally,
it concludes with reflections on the past and future of the Alaska
Constitution.

II. THE TASKS CONFRONTING ALASKA’S DELEGATES
According to William Gladstone, the United States Constitution was
“produced by the human intellect, at a single stroke” at the Philadelphia
Convention of 1787.8 The same could not be said of the Alaska
Constitution. Indeed, the forty-nine men and six women who met in
Fairbanks and drafted that document neither claimed nor sought such
originality.9 As they recognized, their work needed to address itself to
several audiences. First, it had to appeal to members of Congress, who
would ultimately vote on statehood. As Robert Atwood, a leading
member of the Alaska Statehood Committee, put it in a speech to the
delegates: “The document you write will be, can and should be a
8. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 534 (13th ed. 1955) (quoting
William Ewart Gladstone’s letter to the committee in charge of the celebration of
the Centennial Anniversary of the American Constitution dated July 20, 1887).
9. The decision to have fifty-five delegates intentionally harkened back to
the fifty-five delegates who met in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft the U.S.
Constitution. Constitutional Convention, UNIV. OF ALASKA (June 18, 2009),
https://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/constitutional-convention/. Yet the
decision had ramifications beyond tying Alaska’s constitutional convention to
that earlier convention. Having fewer delegates than was normal in twentiethcentury conventions allowed strong personal relationships and a sense of
common purpose to develop—indeed, John Whitehead, the leading chronicler of
the creation of the Alaska Constitution, described the convention’s deliberations
as “a bonding and uniting experience.” JOHN S. WHITEHEAD, COMPLETING THE
UNION: ALASKA, HAWAI’I, AND THE BATTLE FOR STATEHOOD 241 (Howard Lamar et
al. eds., 2004). The best indication of this was the formation, post-convention, of
the “55 Club” that reunited those responsible for creating the state’s first
constitution. Id. at 348. As Henry Wells has noted: “In Hawaii and Alaska, the
conventions evolved into cohesive bodies of dedicated men and women who
came to think of themselves as partners in lofty and historic enterprises that
demanded their best efforts and closest cooperation.” Henry Wells, Constitutional
Conventions in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Alaska, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 52, 63 (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960).
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compelling new argument for statehood itself.”10 More specifically, the
delegates had to craft a document that demonstrated the political
maturity of the state and show that it was ready for self-government.
Members of Congress would consider whether the constitution was
reasonable rather than extreme and in the mainstream rather than
idiosyncratic, which cautioned against including provisions that
departed too much from the prevailing constitutional wisdom.11 Thus,
when the delegates debated whether to establish a unicameral or a
bicameral legislature, delegate Dora Sweeney cautioned that Congress
might not approve a unicameral legislature, and this swayed the vote.12
This concern led delegates to defer some contentious issues, most notably
aboriginal rights and native land claims, which eventually were settled
by the federal Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.13
The same concern may also have led them to frame some guarantees
in the Declaration of Rights (Article I), such as the establishment clause
and the right to bear arms, in language identical to that found in the
federal Bill of Rights, even though other states had adopted different—
and arguably broader—protections of these rights.14 Yet this deference
was not unlimited. The delegates included a guarantee of fair treatment
during legislative investigations, a clear reaction to the hearings Senator
Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee

10. Robert Atwood, Chairman, Alaska Statehood Comm’n, Opening Session
Address at the Alaska Constitutional Convention (Nov. 8, 1955) (transcript
available at http://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/constitutional-convention/
speeches-to-the-conventio/opening-session-speeches/atwood/). This was a
widely shared view: looking back on his experience as a delegate, Vic Fischer
acknowledged that “[m]ost Alaskans originally conceived of constitution writing
primarily as a means to obtain statehood.” Vic Fischer, Alaska’s Constitution, in
ALASKA AT 50: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND NEXT FIFTY YEARS OF ALASKA STATEHOOD
147, 152 (G. W. Kimura ed., 2009). Pro-statehood sentiment was certainly strong
in Alaska. In a 1946 plebiscite Alaskans had supported statehood by 60% to 40%.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 9, at 210.
11. In this respect Alaska’s delegates were no different from those in other
states drafting constitutions as a prelude to statehood. For example, commenting
on Montana’s 1889 constitution, Larry Elison and Fritz Snyder described it as
“enacted more as a tool to achieve statehood than to provide a well-thought-out
structure of governance for the state.” LARRY M. ELISON & FRITZ SNYDER, THE
MONTANA STATE CONSTITUTION 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
12. GERALD A. MCBEATH, THE ALASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 12 (1997).
13. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012).
14. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4 (freedom of religion); id. art. I, § 9 (jeopardy and
self-incrimination); id. art. I, § 10 (treason); id. art. I, § 19 (right to keep and bear
arms). This last provision was amended in 1994 to safeguard an individual right
to keep and bear arms. See GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
AGENCY, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 37 (Alaska Legislative Affairs
Agency ed., 5th ed. 2013).
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conducted, though Senator McCarthy had been disgraced and censured
by the Senate by the time the language was adopted.15
Second, the proposed constitution would have to appeal to Alaska
residents, who had the power to ratify or reject the delegates’
handiwork.16 This cautioned against provisions that might excite
controversy or might be perceived as partisan, considerations that might
alienate voters. It also may have encouraged the delegates to consult
potential voters directly by conducting public hearings at various
locations throughout the state during a fifteen-day recess halfway
through the convention.17 Certainly, these voters were more attentive to
the deliberations in Fairbanks than they were to ordinary legislative
activity.18
This need to enlist popular support may have led the delegates to
include several provisions ensuring that the new government would be
responsive to public opinion. Thus, the constitution set the voting age at
twenty,19 a year lower than that in most states; it established the initiative,
the referendum, and the recall;20 and it mandated that the question of
whether to hold a constitutional convention be submitted to voters every
ten years.21 To quote Atwood’s speech to the delegates once again: “This
is a custom job you have on your hands. It’s to be built and it must please
the customer.”22
Third, the constitution had to create a government that would work,
a real concern given Alaska’s experience with a weak and fragmented
executive and a dysfunctional legislature in the territorial government, or
else it would be quickly changed or discarded. The relative infrequency
of amendment—as of 2017, only forty-three amendments to the
constitution had been proposed and only twenty-nine adopted—testifies
to their success in this respect.23 So too does the populace’s refusal to call
a new convention at the opportunities that it has to do so every ten years.
15. Id. art. I, § 7.
16. Id. art. XIII, § 1.
17. WHITEHEAD, supra note 9, at 247.
18. See CLAUS-M. NASKE, A HISTORY OF ALASKA STATEHOOD 222–24 (1985).
19. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 1. The voting age was lowered to eighteen by
constitutional amendment in 1970. See HARRISON, supra note 14, at 107.
20. ALASKA CONST. art. XI. The constitution authorized only statutory
initiatives, and these had to conform to the requirements for legislatively enacted
statutes, such as the single subject rule. Id. art. II, § 13. The lieutenant governor
can refuse to certify measures, preventing them from appearing on the ballot if
they are clearly unconstitutional. Id. art. XI, § 2.
21. Id. art. XIII, § 3.
22. Atwood, supra note 10.
23. John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2016, in THE BOOK OF THE
STATES 2017 1, 10 tbl.1.1 (Council of State Gov’ts ed., 2017), http://knowledge
center.csg.org/kc/system/files/1.1.2017.pdf.
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Finally, delegates wanted the constitution to be a document that
would earn them the gratitude and respect of future generations.24 This is
hardly surprising. Convention delegates typically share a longer-term
perspective than do legislators, and they usually make a greater effort to
rise above narrow partisan concerns.25 This was certainly true in Alaska:
whereas bitter partisanship dominated sessions of the territorial
legislature, harmony largely prevailed in the constitutional convention.26
To encourage such an atmosphere, the delegates were elected by nonpartisan ballot, though Democrats outnumbered Republicans by about a
2-1 margin;27 and the convention was held at the University of Alaska in
Fairbanks, rather than in the territorial capital of Juneau, in order to signal
that it was not politics as usual.28
The delegate selection process resulted in the most representative
body ever elected in Alaska, and—as has been true in other conventions—
”the assembly of delegates with diverse occupations and backgrounds,
meeting for weeks of deliberations” encouraged “conversations across
great distances in social standing, education, experience, and politics.”29
Delegate Vic Fischer summed up the perspective of his fellow delegates:
“The vision was that we were writing for posterity” and that the
constitution should be designed “to serve a future that not one of us could
really visualize.”30
24. See Constitutional Convention: Delegates, UNIV. OF ALASKA (Apr. 28, 2015),
https://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/constitutional-convention/delegates/
(“The story of the 1955-56 Alaska Constitutional Convention is a good one and is
a pleasure to tell. The main difficulty in telling it lies in passing on to those who
were not there the dedication, the vitality, the exhilaration and the idealism that
in 1955-56 characterized Alaska’s constitution-making process.”).
25. See, e.g., Benjamin Franklin, Speech in Congress, June 11, 1787, available at
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/creating-the-united-states/convention-andratification.html (“For we are sent hither to consult not contend, with each other;
and Declaration of a fix’ Opinion, and of determined Resolutions never to change
it, neither enlighten nor convince us.”).
26. See TERRENCE COLE, FIGHTING FOR THE FORTY-NINTH STATE: C. W. SNEDDEN
AND THE CRUSADE FOR ALASKA STATEHOOD 176–77 (2010).
27. Wells, supra note 9, at 56.
28. In choosing to hold the convention at the state university, removed from
the scene of ordinary politics, Alaska was following the example of New Jersey,
which held its 1947 constitutional convention at Rutgers University. WHITEHEAD,
supra note 9, at 239–40.
29. On the representativeness of the convention, see WHITEHEAD, supra note
9, at 238–39; on deliberative dynamics in constitutional conventions, see BRIDGES,
supra note 2, at 150.
30. Sally H. Campbell, The Alaska Constitution: Promoting Statehood, Providing
Stability, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 685, 686 (George E.
Connor & Christopher W. Hammons eds., 2008). This understanding of the
delegates’ responsibility is hardly unique to Alaska. For example, James
Garlington, a delegate to the Montana convention of 1972, described the
constitution drafted there as “the finest gift to the young people of Montana that
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III. THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION AS A FIRST
CONSTITUTION
As two consultants to the Alaska Constitutional Convention
observed, “the Alaska convention took both a more fundamental and a
more comprehensive view of its task than would the typical convention
in an already admitted state.”31 It could do so because, instead of tinkering
with an existing constitution and the government it established, Alaskans
were creating anew, which encouraged a more expansive view. It is hard
to overestimate the importance of this factor. When a convention is
revising a constitution, it is almost inevitable that it will use the existing
constitution as the basis for its deliberations and retain many noncontroversial provisions of that document.32 Beyond that, interests will
have formed for and against the current arrangements—the most
frequent division in state constitutional conventions is between the
advocates of change and those seeking to safeguard the advantages they
enjoy under the current regime.33 This affects both the alternatives that
are considered and the debate on those alternatives.34

is within our power to give.” ELISON & SNYDER, supra note 11, at 27. And looking
back at his experience as a delegate to the 1947 New Jersey Constitutional
Convention, Wesley Lance observed: “I knew my colleagues well, and they were
politicians before the convention and politicians after the convention, but at the
convention they were statesmen.” Videotape: The Opportunity of a Century (PBS
1987) (on file with author).
31. John E. Bebout & Emil J. Sady, Staging a State Constitutional Convention, in
MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 67, 69 (W. Brooke Graves ed.,
1960).
32. See, e.g., Carol E. Hoffecker & Barbara E. Benson, Festina Lente: The
Development of Constitutionalism in Delaware, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF
AMERICAN STATES 163, 176 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons eds.,
2008); Amy Gossett, The Louisiana Experience: Culture, Clashes, and Codification, in
THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 302, 314 (George E. Connor &
Christopher W. Hammons eds., 2008); James E. Anderson, The Texas Constitution:
Formal and Informal, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 368, 370
(George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons eds., 2008); Jeremy Walling,
Understatement and the Development of Illinois Constitutionalism, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 401 (George E. Connor & Christopher W.
Hammons eds., 2008).
33. See ELMER E. CORNWELL, JR., JAY S. GOODMAN, & WAYNE R. SWANSON, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE POLITICS OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN
STATES 88−95 (1975) (noting that cleavages among groups of delegates could arise
between reformers and those hoping to protect the status quo).
34. See id. at 90 (noting that the delegates in four states overwhelmingly
perceived their deliberations in terms of conflict between reformers and those
attempting to protect the status quo). Of course, other divisions, such as urban
versus rural and Republican versus Democrat, may cross-cut the division based
on attitude toward existing arrangements. Id.
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But even though there was no existing constitution or state
government, Alaska did have a constitutional history of sorts—its
experience as a territory—and that experience influenced the delegates’
deliberations and decisions.35 This is hardly unusual. As Amy Bridges has
observed, “territories had histories of government and law that were the
prologue to convention deliberations and served as a resource for
delegates.”36 Upon its purchase from Russia, Alaska was first governed
as a colony and then as the District of Alaska until 1912, when the Organic
Act of 1912 brought it its first elements of self-government.37 That Act
provided for an elective bicameral legislature—eight seats in the upper
house, sixteen in the lower—which met biennially.38 However, Congress
could veto all its actions,39 the President appointed the territory’s
governor, and all legal actions were heard in federal courts,40 whose
judges were appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate—that is, without any input from the territory’s population.41
The arrangement did not produce good government. As delegate Vic
Fischer put it: “We started with a shared base of knowledge from having
lived through the misgovernment of territorial Alaska.”42
The Alaska delegates believed that a major source of
“misgovernment” was the territorial government’s weak and fragmented
executive,43 so they replaced it with a strong and unified executive. This
was not a foregone conclusion: most state constitutions, particularly those
drafted in the nineteenth century, dispersed executive power by making
multiple executive offices elective.44 By 1880, over two-thirds of the states
elected their secretary of state, their state treasurer, their auditor, and their
attorney general; and even today thirty-nine elect their attorney general,
thirty-four their state treasurer, and thirty-four their secretary of state.45
35. For an overview of Alaska’s early experience after acquisition by the
United States, see generally TED C. HINCKLEY, THE AMERICANIZATION OF ALASKA,
1867–1897 (1972).
36. BRIDGES, supra note 2, at 21.
37. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 387, 37 Stat. 512 (1912).
38. § 4, 37 Stat. at 513.
39. § 3, 37 Stat. at 512.
40. See Strong Alaska Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1913 (noting that Major J.
F. Strong was appointed governor, following the resignation of the previous
governor).
41. CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDER BRYNER, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 3 (2006),
available at https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/soj/docs/state06.pdf.
42. Fischer, supra note 10, at 153.
43. Id.
44. See Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspective, 496
THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 33, 37−38 (1988) (noting how
early state constitutions had weak executive branches).
45. M. Barbara McCarthy, The Widening Scope of American Constitutions 52–55
(1928) (Ph.D. dissertation), reprinted in DISSERTATION COLLECTION PH.D. VOL. 2
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But the delegates rejected this alternative, establishing the governor as the
sole elected statewide executive official, serving a four-year term and
eligible to stand for reelection.46
To avoid a fragmentation of power, the governor was authorized to
supervise all the principal executive departments, to reorganize those
departments if “necessary for effective administration,” to appoint the
heads of the departments (with confirmation by a majority of the
members of the legislature in joint session), and to remove department
heads at his or her discretion.47 The governor was also given a veto and
an item veto.48 Finally, after each federal census, the governor (not the
legislature), assisted by a board, was to reapportion the state.49
It should be noted that in drafting the constitution, the Alaska
delegates were free of one constraint generally imposed on prospective
states. By empowering Congress to admit new states to the Union, the
U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to establish the conditions
under which those states will be admitted.50 In the enabling acts by which
it authorized prospective states to devise constitutions and apply for
statehood, Congress typically imposed conditions on the substance of
state constitutions.51 But Alaskans did not wait for authorization from
Congress to call a convention and draft a constitution.52 Indeed, they
hoped that their unilateral action might spur a reluctant Congress to act
on statehood53—and the absence of an enabling act meant that there were
no mandates from Congress that had to be met. Alaska’s action was
hardly unprecedented—Hawaii likewise held a constitutional convention
(Catholic Univ. ed., 1929); COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, The BOOK OF THE STATES 213
tbl.4.15 (2017), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files /4.15.2017.pdf.
46. ALASKA CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 3–5. In contrast with the U.S. Constitution,
which limits the President to two terms, the Alaska Constitution limits the
governor to two consecutive terms but allows a former governor to run for the
office again after an intervening term. Id. art. III, § 5. The Alaska Constitution does
create the office of lieutenant governor—originally the office was called the
secretary of state—but in general elections, candidates of the same party for the
governor and lieutenant governor run together on a single ticket. Id. art. III, §§ 7–
8.
47. Id. art. III, §§ 23–25.
48. Id. art. II, § 15.
49. Id. art. VI, § 3.
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. The analysis in this paragraph draws on TARR,
supra note 5, at 39–40, and Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and
Patterns of Conditions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119
(2004).
51. See Biber, supra note 50, at 120 (“Of the thirty-seven states admitted to the
Union since the adoption of the Constitution, . . . almost all of them have had some
sort of condition imposed on them when they were admitted.”).
52. See HARRISON, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining the delegates’ plan for
statehood).
53. Id.
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without awaiting an enabling act, as had California, Idaho, and
Washington in the nineteenth century—and the delegates knew that
Congress could still reject the proposed constitution or require changes as
a condition of statehood.54

IV. THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION AS A WESTERN
CONSTITUTION
Despite its distance from the Lower 48, Alaska shares characteristics
with other western states and its constitution-makers confronted many of
the same challenges. One major concern for western states has been the
power of outside economic forces. The states typically “exported primary
products, lacked resources necessary for their own development, and
were dependent on distant investors and the equally distant federal
government for their future prosperity.”55 Thus, during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when several western states
drafted their initial constitutions or revised earlier ones, they sought to
tame the economic and political power of large corporations, such as
mining and railroad companies.56 Even as they sought to circumscribe
corporate power, western constitution-makers had to be careful not to
impose overly burdensome restrictions because the corporations were a
crucial source of capital for economic development.57 Put simply, the
western states wanted “to reap the rewards and avoid the pitfalls of
economic growth.”58
To do so, western constitutions not only reaffirmed the legislature’s
power to regulate corporations, but also included provisions specifically
regulating corporations or creating institutions charged with overseeing
their operations and curbing illicit practices and abuses. For example,
Idaho’s 1889 Constitution declared railroads to be public highways and
subjected their rates to legislative regulation.59 The Idaho and Montana
constitutions forbade enactment of retroactive laws favorable to
railroads,60 while the Idaho Constitution established a labor

54. BRIDGES, supra note 2, at 27.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Id. at 147.
57. See id. at 144−48 (discussing the concerns delegates had when writing the
constitutions of California, New Mexico, and Arizona).
58. Id.
59. IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 5. For discussion of the development of article XI
of the Idaho Constitution, see DENNIS C. COLSON, IDAHO’S CONSTITUTION: THE TIE
THAT BINDS 134–48 (1991).
60. IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 12; MONT. CONST. art. XV, § 13 (repealed 1972).
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commission,61 and the Wyoming Constitution an inspector of mines.62
The Colorado Constitution established a commissioner of mines,63 and
both the Colorado and Wyoming charters directed the legislature to enact
laws regulating ventilation in mines and prohibiting child labor in them.64
Western constitutions also provided legal protections for workers,
aiming to overturn or preempt unfavorable judicial rulings. Thus, the
Montana and Wyoming constitutions abrogated the “fellow-servant”
rule,65 a common-law doctrine that prevented workers from collecting for
work-related injuries. The Wyoming Charter also forbade labor contracts
that released employers from liability for injuries their workers suffered.66
Finally, western constitutions addressed the management and allocation
of valuable resources within their borders. For example, the Colorado,
Utah, and Wyoming constitutions all addressed water rights in great
detail.67
Like earlier western constitutions, the Alaska Constitution
recognizes that the state’s prosperity is tied to powerful economic actors
beyond its borders. It forthrightly commits the state to economic
development: “It is the policy of the State to encourage the settlement of
its land and the development of its resources by making them available
for maximum use.”68 But it insists that such development should work to
the benefit of all residents of the state. There was concern at the time of
the convention that out-of-state corporations like the Kennecott copper
mine were not benefiting Alaska residents and that out-of-state fish trap
owners were depleting the state’s salmon resource.69 Thus, the very first
provision of the Declaration of Rights affirms that “all persons have a
natural right to . . . the enjoyment of the fruits of their own industry,”70
and the maximum development of the state’s resources must be
“consistent with the public interest.”71
61. IDAHO CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
62. WYO. CONST. art. IX, § 1. For discussion of these provisions, see BAKKEN,
supra note 55, at 75–84, and Hicks, supra note 2, at 92–95.
63. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
64. Id. § 2; WYO. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (repealed 1978).
65. MONT. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (repealed 1972); WYO. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
66. WYO. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
67. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5–8; UTAH CONST. art. XVII, § 1; WYO. CONST.
art. VIII. On the debates over water rights in western conventions, see DONALD
PISANI, WATER, LAWN AND LAW IN THE WEST: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1850–
1920 (1996) and BRIDGES, supra note 2, at 70–81.
68. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
69. HARRISON, supra note 14, at 131.
70. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
71. Id. art. VIII, § 1. Article VIII, section 2 directs the legislature to “provide
for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources
belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its
people.” Id. art. VIII, § 2 (emphasis added).
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In seeking the rewards of economic development without its pitfalls,
the Alaska Constitution departs from predecessor western constitutions
in some respects. Here, one sees the interaction of time and place in
constitution-making. First, whereas earlier constitutions eliminated legal
doctrines that disadvantaged workers, the judicial development of tort
law in intervening years had changed the legal landscape and enhanced
protections for workers so that such constitutional safeguards were not
needed.72 Second, the expansion of federal protections for workers—most
notably the National Labor Relations Act73—likewise made superfluous
the inclusion of many protections enshrined in earlier constitutions.
Third, as shall be discussed in greater detail below, during the first half of
the twentieth century, the understanding of appropriate constitutional
design changed dramatically, discouraging the inclusion of detailed
policy prescriptions in state constitutions.74 Therefore, whereas concerns
about corporate power did not change, the constitutional response to
them did.
The Alaska Constitution does seek to reassure non-Alaskans—and
perhaps particularly members of Congress who would vote on
statehood—by prohibiting the state from taxing property owned by nonresidents higher than property owned by residents.75 Yet, in the years
since statehood, when congressional disapproval was no longer a
concern, Alaska has sought to grant preferences to Alaska residents with
regard to hiring, benefits from the Permanent Fund, the hunting of wild
game, and other matters.76 These initiatives have regularly been
challenged in the courts and often invalidated under the U.S. Constitution
or the Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution.77 In response
to this litigation, the Alaska Constitution was amended in 1988 to state
that “[t]his constitution does not prohibit the State from granting
preferences, on the basis of Alaska residence, to residents of the State over
nonresidents to the extent permitted by the Constitution of the United
States.”78

72. For an overview of pertinent developments, see Lawrence Baum &
Bradley C. Canon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New Doctrines in the Law of
Torts, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 83 (Mary
Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982); see also John Fabian Witt, The Long
History of State Constitutions and American Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159 (2005).
73. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
74. See infra Section V.B.
75. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 2.
76. HARRISON, supra note 69, at 10, 40–42.
77. Id. at 41–42.
78. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 23. For a review of the litigation over preferences
to Alaska residents, see HARRISON, supra note 69, at 12–13, 40–42.
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Alaska’s major innovation was the inclusion of an entire Article
devoted to natural resources—Article VIII. Article VIII confirms
legislative authority over the control and allocation of natural resources
but does so in such a way as to prevent exclusive grants or special
privileges. It guarantees “[f]ree access to the navigable or public waters
of the State;”79 mandates that “wherever occurring in their natural state,
fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use;”80
and authorizes the legislature to acquire “sites, objects, and areas of
natural beauty or of historic, cultural, recreational, or scientific value” for
the benefit of the public.81 It directs the legislature to manage the state’s
renewable resources “on the sustained yield principle”—that is, so that
harvesting the resource does not endanger its survival.82 Article VIII bears
some resemblance to provisions in earlier western constitutions dealing
with water rights, but the directive principles it announces and the
legislative authority it confirms are distinctive.

V. THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION AS A MID-TWENTIETHCENTURY CONSTITUTION
The Alaska Constitution is readily identifiable as a mid-twentiethcentury constitution in both its form and its contents. To understand why,
one must consider two key features of state constitution-making:
constitutional borrowing and the progressive view of constitutional
design.
A. Constitutional Borrowing
Throughout American history, the drafters of state constitutions
have looked beyond the borders of their own states, borrowing
extensively from other state constitutions.83 If anything, the passage of
time has increased interstate borrowing. During the nineteenth century,
states seeking congressional approval for their admission to the Union
sought to avoid controversy by modeling their constitutions on those of
existing states.84 In addition, settlers carried constitutional ideas west with
them—indeed, some delegates to western conventions had previously

79. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 14.
80. Id. art. VIII, § 3.
81. Id. art. VIII, § 7.
82. Id. art. VIII, § 4.
83. See Christian G. Fritz, Rethinking the American Constitutional Tradition:
National Dimensions in the Formation of State Constitutions, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 969, 980–
83 (1995).
84. TARR, supra note 5, at 40, 50–55.
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served as delegates in the states from which they emigrated—and they
reproduced in their new homes the constitutional arrangements with
which they were most familiar.85
Common problems also led to common solutions, as the availability
of compilations of state constitutions, upon which delegates relied from
the early nineteenth century, clarified the development of constitutional
thinking and provided models for emulation.86 Thus, John Hicks has
noted that during the late nineteenth century, several western states,
seeking to promote mining and irrigation, adopted similarly expansive
provisions on eminent domain to encourage those activities.87 And
Morgan Kousser has described how in the South during the same period,
the interstate exchange of constitutional ideas and legal materials
furthered a “public conspiracy” to restrict suffrage.88 Finally, on several
occasions, constitutional innovations in one or a few states unleashed a
contagion of emulative change. The transition to an elective judiciary that
began in the mid-nineteenth century illustrates this phenomenon.89
If anything, the professionalization of constitutional reform during
the twentieth century facilitated the process of interstate borrowing.
Among the most important developments was the increased use of
constitutional commissions, which have the staff, time, and expertise
necessary to study the constitutions of other states.90 In some instances,
these commissions have functioned as an alternative to constitutional
conventions, suggesting amendments for legislatures to propose.91 In
other instances, they have served as preparatory commissions for

85. See id. at 983 (stating that some California constitution delegates had
previously served as delegates to other states’ constitutional conventions).
86. See Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited:
Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century
West, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 945, 975–84 (1994) (discussing how constitutional
compilations were widely published and utilized during nineteenth century state
constitutional conventions, facilitating comparison, analysis, and borrowing).
87. Hicks, supra note 2, at 146–47.
88. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880–1910, at 39–
40 (1974).
89. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of
Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARVARD L. REV. 1061 (2010); G. ALAN
TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES 40–47 (2012).
90. See Robert F. Williams, Are Constitutional Conventions a Thing of the Past?
The Increasing Role of State Constitutional Commissions in State Constitutional Change,
1 HOFSTRA L. & POL. SYMP. 1, 9, 21 (1996) (stating sixty-two constitutional
commissions were formed in thirty-five states between 1938 and 1968, and that
constitutional commissions wrote every initial draft of revised state constitutions
proposed by legislatures in the 1970s).
91. Id. at 1.
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conventions, assembling pertinent material and offering analyses of the
constitutions of other states.92 In Alaska, the Statehood Committee
performed this function, aided by outside experts brought in to advise on
the task of constitution-making.93
The extent of constitutional borrowing led one delegate toward the
end of the California convention of 1849 to lament his colleagues’ lack of
originality, insisting that the preamble at least should contain “a few lines
. . . of our own manufacture.”94 Yet, recurrence to the constitutional
experience of other jurisdictions involves more than a mindless copying
of provisions. Rather, it has been a way of consulting the experience of
other states and partaking of the accumulated wisdom born of that
experience, thereby encouraging more informed choices.95 Moreover,
constitutional borrowing has involved more than the transfer of
particular provisions from one state to another. States have also borrowed
their conceptions of proper constitutional design—what a constitution
should look like, what it should contain, what it should omit, etc.—from
other states.
B. The Progressive Conception of Constitutional Design
Although the states’ willingness to consult the constitutions of other
states may not have changed, where they have looked and what they have
found certainly have. State constitution-making was at its height during
the nineteenth century, when American states adopted ninety-four
constitutions.96 During that era, delegates to constitutional conventions
tended to view constitution-making as a progressive enterprise, requiring
the constant readjustment of past practices and institutional
arrangements in light of changes in circumstances and political thought.97
Delegates also believed that the experience of self-government had
expanded the fund of knowledge about constitutional design, so that later
generations were better situated to frame constitutions than were their
less experienced, and hence less expert, predecessors.98 This encouraged
92. Id. at 11–12.
93. ALASKA STATE COURT LAW LIBRARY, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH
SOURCES 1 (2011) (noting that the Alaska Statehood Committee contracted with a
non-profit organization that provided research, analysis, and advice to
government organizations to prepare several staff reports for use by delegates to
the Alaska Constitutional Convention).
94. Fritz, supra note 86, at 981.
95. BRIDGES, supra note 2, at 143.
96. TARR, supra note 5, at 96, tbl.4.1.
97. Fritz, supra note 86, at 973.
98. Christian G. Fritz, Constitution Making in the Nineteenth-Century American
West, in LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT, LAW FOR THE BEAVER: ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL HISTORY
OF THE NORTH AMERICAN WEST 292, 302–04 (John McLaren et al. eds., 1992).
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them to avail themselves of “the institutional knowledge and experience
that was unavailable to the eighteenth-century founders.”99 It also
influenced where they looked for guidance. The interest in “modern”
constitutional design discouraged borrowing from older constitutions,
including the Federal Constitution, and encouraged appropriating
provisions and ideas from the most recently revised state constitutions.100
This reliance on “modern” constitutional ideas continued during the
twentieth century, even as a shift was occurring in the dominant
understanding of what a state constitution should look like.101 During the
latter part of the nineteenth century, the prevailing view was that
legislators could not be trusted to faithfully represent popular sentiments,
so policy choices should be enshrined in state constitutions rather than
left to legislative discretion, and legislative power should be hemmed in
with stringent constitutional limitations.102 Not surprisingly, the
constitutions of the period tended to be long and detailed.
But a crucial change in constitutional views occurred in the earlytwentieth century, with the crucial development being the publication of
the National Municipal League’s Model State Constitution in 1924.103 This
model constitution reflected the view that the purpose of state
constitutions was to enable state governments to respond vigorously to
the problems affecting the states. Proactive state government required “a
flexible and adaptable instrument which helps us in the solution of
today’s problems” and which would be “flexible and adaptable, with only
minor modifications, in managing tomorrow’s tasks as well.”104
Modernization of state constitutions meant concentrating political
authority in the hands of the governor. This was done by eliminating the
independent election of other executive-branch officers, collecting the
myriad independent boards and agencies into a manageable number of
executive departments, and enhancing the governor’s power over
99. JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 63 (2006).
100. TARR, supra note 5, at 98.
101. See id. at 53 (showing how developments during the twentieth century
facilitated interstate borrowing).
102. Id. at 118–22.
103. NAT’L MUN. LEAGUE, A MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION (1924). For the
political theory underlying the Model State Constitution, see Daniel J. Elazar, The
Principles and Traditions Underlying American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 22
(1982); see also Kermit L. Hall, Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of
American State Constitutions, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 388, 407–10 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottleib eds., 1991).
Alaska’s delegates relied on the fifth edition of the Model State Constitution,
published in 1948, available at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.
39015030798022;view=1up;seq=1.
104. Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time,
54 VA. L. REV. 928, 929 (1968).
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budgetary matters through the executive budget, the item veto, and other
devices. It also required removal of the procedural and substantive
impediments to legislative action favored by nineteenth-century
constitution-makers and refusal to constitutionalize policy choices, as that
might unduly limit government’s ability to respond to changing
conditions. A study of state constitutions proposed in the 1960s and 1970s,
after the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Reynolds v. Sims,105 found that all
the revised state constitutions moved closer to the Model State
Constitution, some dramatically so.106
It is hardly surprising that Alaska’s constitution reflects this
constitutional understanding. Those who drafted the Alaska Constitution
relied heavily on the Model State Constitution and other reform
literature.107 Moreover, the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, which
likewise relied on that literature and was praised by reformers as “the
most modern state constitution,” also had a significant influence on the
Alaska Constitution.108 Prior to the convention, the Statehood Committee
contracted with the Public Administration Service in Chicago to prepare
briefing papers and copies of recent state constitutions for the delegates,
and these also communicated the reform perspective.109 Finally, the
convention hired nine out-of-state consultants to share their expertise and
assist the convention deliberations.110 Among these reformers was John
Bebout, who had likewise assisted in the creation of the New Jersey
Constitution.111 The details of what the Alaska delegates chose from the

105. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
106. CORNWELL, supra note 34, at 156–59. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court held
that states had to apportion both houses of their state legislatures on the basis of
population. 377 U.S. at 568. This ruling directly led to constitutional change, as
states were obliged to revise their constitutions to comply with the Court’s ruling.
See G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Politics: An Historical Perspective, in
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND
HISTORICAL PATTERNS 3 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996). The ruling also indirectly
encouraged constitutional change by freeing rural legislators to support
constitutional reform. ALBERT L. STURM, THIRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONMAKING: 1938-1968, at 61 (1970). Previously these legislators had usually opposed
constitutional reform, fearful that a new constitution would lead to
reapportionment, jeopardizing their privileged position. Id.
107. WHITEHEAD, supra note 9, at 243.
108. John P. Keith, Recent Constitutional Conventions in the Older States, in
MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 39 (W. Brooke Graves ed.,
1967).
109. WHITEHEAD, supra note 9, at 242.
110. Id. at 242–43.
111. See generally John E. Bebout & Joseph Harrison, The Working of the New
Jersey Constitution of 1947, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 337 (1968), available at
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&a
rticle=2841&context=wmlr.
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Model State Constitution and contemporary state constitutions are
detailed in the next section.

VI. THE ALASKA AND HAWAII EXPERIENCES COMPARED
Alaska was not the only western state that crafted its first
constitution during the mid-twentieth century. Like Alaska, Hawaii held
a constitutional convention without waiting for authorization from
Congress, and the “hope chest constitution” that emerged from that 1950
convention was likewise meant to spur Congress to grant statehood.112
Because Alaska and Hawaii are so closely linked in their constitutional
history and in the campaign for statehood, a comparison of the drafting
and substance of their constitutions might be enlightening.
Both territories authorized conventions following plebiscites that
approved efforts to secure statehood—Alaska’s in 1946, Hawaii’s six
years earlier113 (indeed, Hawaii was often in the lead, with Alaska
following its example). Both territories elected their convention delegates
in non-partisan elections, but the composition of the conventions differed
considerably. Hawaii’s delegates were an extraordinarily diverse group:
of the sixty-three delegates, twenty-seven were Caucasian; nineteen of
Japanese ancestry; twelve of Hawaiian or part-Hawaiian ancestry; and
five of Chinese ancestry.114 In Alaska, only one delegate, Frank
Peratovich, was an Alaska Native.115
This difference in composition affected the contents of the two states’
constitutions. The Hawaii Constitution expressly dealt with the diversity
of heritage and culture in the state, confirming that “[t]he State shall have
the power to preserve and develop the cultural, creative and traditional
arts of its various ethnic groups.”116 It also banned segregation in any state
military organization.117 In contrast, the Alaska Constitution did not
directly address the cultural diversity of the territory, and an effort by
delegate Muktuk Marston to include a state land grant to Alaska Natives
was defeated.118 Yet the presence of the single Alaska Native delegate was
important because Peratovich succeeded in limiting the English-language
requirement for voting to the ability to read or speak the language, rather
than read and speak the language, insisting that some older Alaska

112.
(1993).
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

ANNE FEDER LEE, THE HAWAII STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 9
WHITEHEAD, supra note 9, at 210, 236.
LEE, supra note 112, at 8.
Campbell, supra note 30, at 688.
HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 9.
Id. art. I, § 9.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 9, at 245.
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Natives who lacked reading ability were nonetheless well-qualified to
vote.119 In contrast, the proposed Hawaii Constitution required voters to
speak, read, and write English or Hawaiian.120
Both the Hawaii and Alaska constitutions reflected the prevailing
constitutional wisdom, elaborated in the Model State Constitution and
enshrined in the recent New Jersey Constitution. The Alaska and Hawaii
constitutions are relatively brief documents, featuring strong executives,
unified court systems, and few non-civil-liberties restrictions on state
legislatures. Both follow the Model State Constitution in providing for
home rule, although the local government provisions of the two
documents differ based on the different geographic configurations and
settlement patterns in Alaska and Hawaii.121 Both also promote popular
engagement in governing by providing for a periodic vote on whether to
hold a constitutional convention, although only Alaska follows the Model
State Constitution in providing for the initiative, referendum, and
recall.122 Both largely copy the same litany of rights found in the Model
State Constitution, though the Alaska Constitution departs from both the
Model State Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution in omitting a
right to organize and bargain collectively123 (Hawaii had a long history of
strong unions). Neither constitution originally followed the Model State
Constitution’s recommendation of an eighteen-year-old voting age,
instead extending the voting age to twenty.124 Finally, both follow the
Model State Constitution in expressly recognizing a state responsibility
for providing education, promoting public health, and offering public
welfare.125 Thus, the similarities between the Alaska and Hawaii
constitutions far outweigh the differences.
Yet, whereas the Alaska Constitution has remained relatively
unchanged since its adoption, the Hawaii Constitution has not. In 1968,
less than a decade after statehood, Hawaii held a constitutional
convention, which resulted from conflict in the state over
reapportionment, ultimately leading to a federal district court ordering

119. Id.
120. HAW. CONST. art. II, § 1. This requirement was removed by constitutional
amendment in 1968. ANNE FEDER LEE, THE HAWAII STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 72 (1993).
121. The Hawaii Constitution promotes considerable centralization of power
in the state government. See, e.g., id. art. X (providing a single statewide system of
public education). On the contrary, Alaska developed a distinctive system of local
government based on boroughs. ALASKA CONST. art. X.
122. ALASKA CONST. art. X; id. art. XIII, § 3; HAW. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
123. See generally ALASKA CONST.; HAW. CONST. art. XIII.
124. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. II, § 1. Both states
subsequently lowered the voting age to eighteen.
125. ALASKA CONST. art. VII; HAW. CONST. arts. IX, X.
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the legislature to place the question of calling a constitutional convention
on the ballot.126 Once the people approved a convention, the delegates did
not limit themselves to remedying malapportionment—they proposed
twenty-three amendments, of which twenty-two were ratified.127 Ten
years later, voters approved another convention, which proposed thirtyfour amendments, all of which were ratified.128 Thus, while Alaska has
averaged less than one amendment every two years, Hawaii has averaged
almost two amendments every year.129 Put differently, the similarities
between the two constitutions did not mean that they met the needs of
their states equally well.

VII. CONCLUSION
Writing during the American Founding, John Adams noted: “How
few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making an
election of government, more than of air, soil, or climate for themselves
or their children!”130 Yet Alaskans had that opportunity when they
created their constitution, and we continue to celebrate their achievement
sixty years later. The constitution created the government of the state and
has ever since affected the policies it has produced. It has also forged links
between the government and the state’s citizens, and at its best it has
safeguarded their rights while embodying and advancing their
aspirations.131 It has even influenced constitutional developments beyond
the borders of the state. To take but one example, when Michigan
developed the environmental article for its 1963 constitution, it drew its
inspiration from the Alaska Constitution.132 Small wonder, then, that the
National Municipal League praised it as “one of the best, if not the best,
state constitutions ever written.”133
Yet, let me end by quoting another eminent founder, Thomas
Jefferson. Jefferson warned that “some men look at constitutions with
126. LEE, supra note 112, at 11.
127. Id. at 14.
128. Id. at 18.
129. Dinan, supra note 23, at 10 tbl.1.1.
130. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787,
127 (1969).
131. These accomplishments, of course, are not peculiar to Alaska. See G. Alan
Tarr, The State of State Constitutions, 62 LA. L. REV. 3, 7 (2001) (asserting that state
constitutions create state institutions, influence the effectiveness of state
government policymaking approaches, and build connections between state
governments and citizens).
132. EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 164 (2013); DAVE DEMPSEY,
RUIN & RECOVERY: MICHIGAN’S RISE AS A CONSERVATION LEADER (2001).
133. NASKE, supra note 18, at 224.
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sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too
sacred to touch.”134 This is a mistake, he insisted, because each generation
“has a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most
promotive of its own happiness.”135 In addition, “laws and institutions
must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind,” and what
served the purposes of past generations may not serve those of current or
future generations.136 He therefore proposed that each generation
consider anew the constitutional handiwork of its predecessors, drawing
on the experience of life under the document.137 Alaska’s founders
themselves were persuaded by Jefferson’s argument, providing for a
periodic vote on whether to call a new constitutional convention,
although no such convention has yet been approved.
Nevertheless, amendments have expanded the rights available to
Alaska residents—a ban on sex discrimination,138 a right to privacy,139 and
protection for the rights of victims of crime.140 They have also provided
for the long-term fiscal health of the state through creation of the
Permanent Fund,141 appropriations limits,142 and a budget reserve fund.143
There is no better way for Alaska’s citizens to honor its fifty-five founders
than by using the accumulated wisdom of experience to engage in the
task of constitutional renewal and improvement as conditions change and
new problems arise.

134. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816),
http://www.let.rug.nl./usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomasjefferson/jefl246.php [hereinafter Jefferson Letter].
135. Id.
136. Id. For more on the importance of such popular constitutionalism in the
present day and in the state constitutional context, see G. Alan Tarr, Popular
Constitutionalism in State and Nation, 77 OHIO ST. L. REV. 237 (2016).
137. Jefferson Letter, supra note 134.
138. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3.
139. Id. art. I, § 22.
140. Id. art. I, § 24.
141. Id. art. IX, § 15.
142. Id. art. IX, § 16.
143. Id. art. IX, § 17.

